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THE COURT’S WORKLOAD AND MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
During 2014 the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court”) delivered 
891 judgments, in respect of 2,388 applications.1 The Grand Chamber of the Court 
delivered 19 of those judgments.2 Single-Judge Formations, which began operating in 
2010, determined (i.e. declared inadmissible/struck-out) 78,660 cases in 2014.3 When 
combined with a decrease in applications allocated to judicial formations of fifteen 
percent (the total number allocated was 56,250) in 2014,  partly explained by the 
Court’s tougher assessment of eligible applications, the Court was able to reduce its 
backlog of pending cases to 69,900 at the end of December 2014.4  This continuing 
reduction in the size of the backlog, from what President Spielmann described as the 
“astronomical figure” of 160,000 pending application in 2011, was an “exceptionally 
positive trend” in the view of the President.5 However, President Spielmann has 
identified repetitive cases (well-founded new applications concerning systemic problems 
in States which have already been found to breach the European Convention on Human 
Rights (hereinafter “the Convention” or “the ECHR”) as a serious problem. Such cases 
now comprise more than half of the Court’s pending caseload. Consequently the 
President publicly emphasised “the need for each member State to ensure that endemic 
problems were resolved at domestic level rather than being brought before the Court.”6 
 In March 2015 the Belgian government, acting in its role as Chair of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, organised a High-level Conference on 
the “Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, our shared 
responsibility”. Ministers of Justice of the Member States, leading figures from the 
Council of Europe (including the Secretary General, President of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, President of the Court and the Commissioner of Human Rights), the First Vice 
President of the European Commission and representatives of non-governmental human 
rights organizations participated in the two day conference held in Brussels. The 
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conference was a follow-up to the Brighton Conference, held three years earlier, when 
the British government was chairing the Committee of Ministers.7 
The Court, in its formal contribution to the Conference, expressed the view that 
 … sharing responsibility for the protection of human rights – to be contrasted 
strongly with any idea of shifting responsibility – holds out the prospect of a new, 
more stable equilibrium in the Convention system, making for a stronger human 
rights regime in Europe, to the greater benefit of all those who are protected by it.8 
Regarding the preventing of ECHR violations the Court emphasised the roles of, inter 
alios, national parliaments in considering the human rights implications of legislation 
they enacted and domestic courts in safeguarding observance of such rights. 
Furthermore, regarding the optional advisory opinion procedure, created by Protocol 
No.16 to the ECHR9, the Court noted: 
…the potential of the procedure to aid national courts in their consideration of 
Convention issues so that problems are resolved at the national level, and looks 
forward to its entry into force. Yet to date there have been no ratifications. The 
Brussels conference should support the Protocol by calling on signatory States to 
complete the process of ratification, and encouraging more States to accept it.10 
 The Conference resulted in the State Parties issuing the Brussels Declaration.11 In 
that document the Parties reaffirmed their commitment to the ECHR and to the right of 
individual application to the Court. They also restated “the firm determination of the 
State Parties to fulfil their primary obligation to ensure that the rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Convention and its protocols are fully secured at national level, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity.”12 Responding to the Court’s contribution to the 
Conference, the Declaration called on State Parties to “consider signing and ratifying 
Protocol No. 16”.13 The Declaration also contained an Action Plan. This document invited 
the Court to provide brief reasons for inadmissibility decisions made by single judges 
from January 2016. The Court was encouraged to consider also providing such reasons 
for its decisions indicating provisional measures and when the screening panel refuses to 
accept a case for referral to the Grand Chamber. Under the Plan State Parties were 
called upon to, inter alia, improve the training of national officials on the ECHR and 
encourage the involvement of national parliaments in the execution of Court judgments. 
The Plan encouraged the Committee of Ministers to support an increases in the resources 
                                                          
7
 For a commentary on that event see A. Mowbray, “ECtHR May 2011-April 2012”, 18(4) Eur. Pub. L. 566 
(2012). 
 
8
 Paper 26/1/2015 at para. 3. 
 
9
 See, A. Mowbray, “ECtHR May 2013-April 2014”, 20(4) Eur. Pub. L. 579 at p. 582 (2014). 
 
10
 Supra n.8 at para.10. 
 
11
 27 March 2015. 
 
12
 Ibid. at para. 2. The Court’s use of the latter principle is analysed in A. Mowbray****HRLR article*** 
 
13
 Ibid. at para. 14. 
 
3 
 
of the Department for the Execution of Judgments, which undertakes the detailed work 
involved in the Committee’s supervisory role. By the end of 2019 the Committee of 
Ministers should decide whether more major reforms of the Convention system are 
necessary. 
 Individual applicants and their legal advisers (if they have them) are likely to 
welcome the Court’s intention to start providing reasons for inadmissibility decisions 
taken by single judges of the Court. As the Belgian Justice Minister noted at the end of 
the Conference this reform should; “increase transparency, predictability and legal 
certainty and it would answer legitimate and current expectations of the citizens.”14 
However, given the enormous numbers of these decisions made in recent times15 it is 
likely that the reasons given will be pretty formulaic if the Court (in reality its Registry 
staff) are not to be diverted into allocating even more precious resources to dealing with  
inadmissible applications. 
 
ARTICLE 3: TORTURE OF G8 PROTESTOR 
A unanimous Chamber found that the Italian police had tortured a peaceful protestor 
during the G8 international economic summit held in Genoa during July 2001: in Cestaro 
v Italy16. Whilst the summit was taking place, between 19 to 21 July 2001, various non-
governmental organizations convened an anti-globalisation event in other parts of the 
city. Violent incidents between some protestors and  the police/security forces occurred 
across Genoa with several hundred persons injured and extensive damage to property 
being caused.  Genoa city council allowed the protestors to use a school as a night 
shelter. However, local residents notified the police that violent demonstrators, members 
of the “black blocks”, were in the school. During the night of 21- 22 July a police riot 
squad stormed  the school to seek members of the black blocks. The applicant, a man of 
62, was inside the school sitting against a wall with his arms raised when the police 
encountered him. Nevertheless officers kicked him and hit him with their truncheons, 
causing multiple fractures which left him with permanent damage to his right arm and 
leg. Three years of investigations by the Genoa public prosecutor’s office resulted in 28 
officers being prosecuted in connection with the police raid on the school. In 2008, 12 
officers were sentenced to between two and four years’ imprisonment and with the 
Ministry of the Interior ordered to pay specified victims between EUR 2,500 and 50,000  
compensation. The applicant received a provisional award of EUR 35,000. On appeal the 
Court of Cassation found that the police  raid had been conducted with a punitive aim of 
reprisal against protestors and the conduct of  the officers amounted to torture of the 
victims. 
 The Chamber agreed that the applicant had been subjected to torture, noting  
that the violence inflicted on him had been totally gratuitous and he had done nothing to 
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warrant the use of such force against him. However, despite the efforts of the public 
prosecutor, the officers actually responsible  for the torture of the applicant had not been 
identified or punished. This was in part because the police had refused to assist the 
prosecutor in discovering the identity of the relevant officers. The Chamber deplored the 
lack of cooperation by the police. Furthermore, the Chamber observed  that under Italian 
law the offences committed against  the applicant had become time barred before the 
appellate stages of the proceedings had been completed. Consequently, the Chamber 
also found a procedural breach of Article 3 due to inadequate criminal legislation 
punishing acts of torture. This was a structural failure in Italian law and the Chamber 
considered that changes were necessary to ensure adequate criminal punishment of such  
serious ill-treatment. Having regard to the compensation awarded to the applicant 
during the domestic proceedings the Chamber ruled that Italy should pay him EUR 
45,000  just satisfaction in regard to his non-pecuniary damage. 
 This case disclosed a terrible example of police officers taking the law into their 
own hands and inflicting extreme violence on a peaceful protestor. The abuse of power 
by the officers who tortured the applicant was further compounded by the unwillingness 
of the police authorities to assist the public prosecutor seeking to bring the offenders to 
justice. It is rare for a long-established State Party to the ECHR to be found liable for 
acts of torture. Whilst it is absolutely no excuse for the police violence revealed in 
Cestaro we can observe that the Court has already had to determine other complaints 
involving the G8 Genoa protests that illustrated the aggression being directed against 
the police and security forces by some protestors. In Giuliani and Gaggio v Italy17, the 
Grand Chamber found that the applicants’ son/brother was a member of a mob attacking 
two carabiniere sitting in their jeep. Despite warnings from the carabiniere, the protestor 
was about to throw a fire extinguisher at the officers when one of them shot him dead. A 
large majority of the Grand Chamber (13 votes to 4) found the officer’s actions fell 
within the Article 2(2)(a) exception to the right to life, where absolutely necessary force 
was used in defence of a person from unlawful violence. However, the Grand Chamber 
was more divided, by ten votes to seven, when it found the planning of the police 
operations at the G8 summit satisfied the requirements of Article 2. 
ARTICLE 6: DELAYED ACCESS TO LEGAL ADVICE DURING QUESTIONING BY THE POLICE 
The circumstances where the police can delay a suspect’s access to legal advice were 
examined by a Chamber in Ibrahim and Others v UK18. The background to these 
combined applications were the four attempted suicide bombings on public transport in 
London on 21st  July 2005. Two weeks earlier four other suicide bombers had killed fifty- 
two people and injured hundreds of others on underground trains and a bus in London. 
Three of the applicants detonated explosive devices (containing metal shrapnel), in 
back-packs they were wearing, whilst travelling on public transport during the 21st July. 
However, due to the concentration level of the explosive liquid used, the main charges of 
the applicants’ devices failed to explode. They then fled the scenes of their actions. 
Pictures of the four bombers were recorded by closed-circuit television cameras and the 
police began a nation-wide hunt for the suspects. The first of the applicants to be 
arrested, in Birmingham, was Mr Omar early in the morning of 27 July. He was taken to 
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a police station in London and informed of his right to consult a solicitor, but that this 
right could be delayed  for up to forty-eight hours. He sought to exercise this right and a 
Superintendent then determined that Omar should be held incommunicado, under the 
provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000. Soon afterwards Omar was subject to a  series of 
“safety interviews” by police officers, in accordance with the above Act, designed to gain 
information in order to protect life and prevent serious damage to property. The officers 
were trying to discover whether there were more explosive devices and the whereabouts 
of the other suspected bombers. The answers Omar provided were subsequently 
discovered to be lies. He was allowed access to a solicitor just after 4pm that day. Mr 
Ibrahim was arrested, in London, on the 29th July. When he arrived at the police station, 
at 2:20pm  he requested legal assistance. Subsequently a Superintendent determined 
that he should be held incommunicado and be subject to a safety interview. Ibrahim told 
the police that he had no knowledge of planned attacks on the public. Subsequently, 
after being allowed time for sleep, he was given access to a solicitor at just after 10pm. 
The third applicant, Mr Mohammed, was arrested later in the afternoon at the same 
address as Ibrahim. He requested legal advice at 4:39pm and a Superintendent 
authorised a safety interview and denial of immediate access to a lawyer. He refuted any 
involvement in the attempted bombings on the 21st. After being allowed to pray and eat 
he was permitted access to a solicitor at 9:45pm. The fourth applicant, Mr Abdurahman, 
was a friend of one of the attempted bombers. He met the bomber, by chance, at a 
London railway station on the 23rd July. They returned to Abdurahman’s home and the 
bomber stayed there until the 26th July, according to the applicant because he was 
frightened of the bomber. Following surveillance evidence the police asked Abdurahman 
to assist them as a potential witnesses. He agreed and voluntarily went to a police 
station. Officers began interviewing him at 6:15 on 27th July. Within an hour the officers 
believed he was providing incriminating statements against himself. A senior officer 
ordered that Abdurahman should not be given a caution and advised of his right to legal 
assistance. During the next twelve hours he provided a witnesses statement detailing his 
involvement with the suspected bomber. He was then arrested, cautioned and notified of 
his right to legal assistance. He declined the help of a lawyer. On the 30th he was 
provided with access to a solicitor and subject to further interviews as a suspect. 
 The first three applicants (and another person) were tried for conspiracy to 
murder in 2007. Their defence was that although they had detonated the explosives it 
had merely been a hoax designed to protest against the war in Iraq and they had 
constructed the devices so that the main charges would not detonate. The trial lasted 
seven months. The prosecution sought to invoke the answers given by the applicants 
during their safety interviews, without legal assistance, to demonstrate that the bomb 
events were not a hoax. Forensic and communications evidence was also presented by 
the prosecution. The applicants, unsuccessfully, sought to persuade the judge to exclude 
the safety interviews answers. But, in his summing up to the jury the judge told them 
that they should take into account that the safety interviews had been conducted without 
legal assistance for the suspects. The jury convicted the applicants and the judge 
imposed life sentences on them, with a minimum term of forty year’s imprisonment. The 
Court of Appeal refused the applicants leave to appeal. 
  The fourth applicant was tried for allegedly assisting one of the 
conspirators and failing to disclose information about a terrorist incident. He also sought 
to have his statements given without legal assistance excluded, but the judge refused 
his request noting that the police had not behaved in an oppressive manner. The jury 
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convicted him and he was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal 
found the failure of the police to caution the applicant/notify him of his right to legal 
assistance when he began making self-incriminatory statements “troubling”. Given that 
he had provided some help to the police, the Court of Appeal reduced his sentence to 
eight year’s imprisonment. 
 The four applicants complained to the Court arguing that they had suffered 
breaches of Article 6(1) (right to a fair trial) and Article 6(3)(c) (right to legal assistance) 
due to their police interviews without legal advice and the subsequent use of their 
statements during their trials. The Chamber decided to determine the applications 
without an oral hearing. The Court noted that its main role under Article 6(1) was to 
assess the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings and that Article 6(3) provided 
specific elements of a fair trial. Established jurisprudence provided that the right to legal 
representation could be restricted for good cause. The Grand Chamber had ruled that: 
…Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as 
from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in 
the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling 
reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally 
justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction – whatever its justification – 
must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6 ... The rights of 
the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating 
statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used 
for a conviction.19 
The Chamber considered that this reasoning contained two components. First did the 
police have “compelling reasons” to delay access to legal help? The applicants’ 
circumstances were different from Salduz as they were only, initially, denied legal 
assistance after individual determinations by a senior officer (rather than because of a 
general legal ban on such assistance). Furthermore at the time the police made  those 
decisions they were dealing with an urgent threat of further bombings potentially 
involving mass murders. Given the scale of the police investigations there were also 
limited facilities for allowing secure legal access to the applicants. The questioning in the 
safety interviews of  the three applicants suspected of being bombers demonstrated that 
the police were primarily seeking to discover the extent of the threat to the public rather 
than the criminal liability of the applicants. Regarding the questioning of the fourth 
applicant, without a lawyer, the Chamber noted the Court of Appeal’s concerns, but he 
was providing important information about the bombers (three of whom were still at 
large). Therefore, the Chamber found that: 
…it has been convincingly established that at the time of the impugned police 
interviews there was an exceptionally serious and imminent threat to public safety 
and that this threat provided compelling reasons which justified the temporary 
delay of all four applicants’ access to lawyers.20 
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The second element of the Salduz principle was, accepting that the police had 
justification for delaying access to lawyers, did the use of statements given by the 
applicants during those interviews at their subsequent trials cause them such prejudice 
as to undermine the overall fairness of the proceedings? Regarding the applicants 
convicted of conspiracy to murder the Chamber noted that they were denied access to 
lawyers for only between four to eight hours, whilst domestic legislation permitted delays 
of up to forty-eight hours. Nor did the applicants claim they were subjected  to coercion 
by the police during the safety interviews. The trial judge had undertaken an extensive 
consideration, including  the Court’s relevant jurisprudence, of the applicants’ request for 
the safety interview statements to be excluded. This had been reviewed by the Court of 
Appeal which observed  that the applicants had lied during those interviews. The 
Chamber also acknowledged that there was a “wealth” of other evidence presented 
against the applicants during their lengthy trial.  
In the present case, it must be borne in mind that the applicants, not the 
prosecution, brought the safety interview statements into play at trial by deploying 
a defence that was later described by the Court of Appeal as “ludicrous”. Their 
defence had all the hallmarks of being tailored to fit the rest of the prosecution 
case against them. It would not have struck the correct balance between the 
applicants’ Article 6 right and the general interest in their prosecution if, when 
faced with that hoax defence, the prosecution had been unable to rely on 
statements from the applicants that not only undermined that defence but flatly 
contradicted it.21 
Therefore, subject to one dissent, the Chamber found no breach of Article 6(1) read in 
conjunction with Article 6(3) regarding the conspiracy applicants. The same majority also 
found no breach of these rights in the case of the fourth applicant due, inter alia, to the 
strength of the other evidence produced against him at his trial. Judge Kalaydjieva 
dissented on several grounds, including her rejection that the police should have been 
allowed to delay access to lawyers in order protect the investigation from leaks. 
 Overall, the above judgment is an important elaboration of how the Court will 
undertake an evaluation of the lawfulness of police delaying suspects access to legal 
assistance. It is clear that the police have to be facing an extremely dangerous criminal 
threat to the public to be able to justify such a delay. Sadly, the facts of Ibrahim and 
Others indeed represented that type of scenario. Given the scale of the terrorist threats 
and the complexity of the ongoing police investigation into the multiple bomb incidents 
the relatively short time delay in providing the suspects with access to lawyers whilst 
safety interviews were conducted was a proportionate response. It is commendable that 
the police delayed access for periods of time considerably less than that allowed by 
statute. As to the subsequent use of statements obtained during those interviews in the 
applicants’ trials the Court examined whether this had prejudiced the fairness of the 
proceedings. Given the opportunity of the applicants to dispute this matter before the 
judge and his reasoned ruling (applying Strasbourg case-law), together with the nature 
of the conspiracy applicants’ defence and other prosecution evidence the Chamber did 
not find any unfairness. This was a good example of domestic courts and the Strasbourg 
Court performing their distinct functions harmoniously.  
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ARTICLE 9 : BAN ON FACIAL COVERINGS 
A Grand Chamber ruled on the sensitive topic of a criminal law prohibition of the 
concealment of the face in public places in S.A.S. v France22. The applicant was a French 
national, who had been born in Pakistan and brought up in the Sunni culture, and she 
submitted that as a devout Muslim she wore the burqa (a full-body covering including a 
mesh over the face) and the niqab (a full-face veil with just an opening for the eyes) in 
accordance with her religious beliefs, culture and personal convictions. She did not 
always wear the niqab in public or private, but in accordance with her spiritual feelings 
(e.g. she believed that she should wear it in public during Ramadan). She did not object 
to having to remove the niqab for security checks in public places (such as at airports) 
and it was not her intention to annoy other members of the public by her clothing. 
 In 2009 a parliamentary commission was established in France to examine the 
wearing of the full-face veil on national territory. The subsequent report noted that the 
wearing of the full-face veil in France was a recent phenomenon and involved less than 
2000 women by 2009. The report found that the practice pre-dated the emergence of 
Islam and it was not a religious duty, “but stemmed from a radical affirmation of 
individuals in search of identity in society and from the action of extremist 
fundamentalist movements.”23 The practice was considered to be contrary to the values 
of the French Republic according to the parliamentarians. At around the same time the 
French Advisory Commission on Human Rights produced an opinion against a general 
ban on the wearing of the full-face veil, because, inter alia, of the dangers of 
stigmatising Muslims. A few days later the Prime Minister requested the Conseil d’Etat to 
undertake a study on the legal grounds for a ban of the full-veil. In the spring of 2010 
the Conseil d’Etat reported that it could not recommend a general  ban on the full-veil 
alone, but a wider ban on face-coverings in public places would be lawful. A draft Bill was 
introduced a few weeks later. The accompanying explanatory memorandum expressed 
the view that the concealment of a person’s face in public was, “contrary to the ideal of 
fraternity” and fell short of “the minimum requirement of civility that is necessary for 
social interaction”.24  Law no.2010-1192 was passed by the National Assembly in July 
2010, with just one vote against and three abstentions. The Law made it a criminal 
offence, punishable with a maximum fine of 150 euros and/or an obligation to attend a 
citizenship course, for a person to wear in a public place clothing that is designed to 
conceal the face. An accompanying circular from the Prime Minister elaborated that the 
ban applied to, inter alia, balaclavas, full-face veils and masks. Furthermore, public 
places included the premises of any public institution  and places where the public could 
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gain access on payment (e.g. cinemas). In 2013 the Court of Cassation found no breach 
of ECHR Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) in an appeal by a woman 
convicted under the Law for wearing a full-face veil outside the Elysee Palace (whilst 
demonstrating against the Law). 
 The applicant had not been convicted under the Law, but her lawyers (all based in 
the UK) contended that it violated, inter alia, her rights to respect for her private life and 
freedom to manifest her religious beliefs. The Chamber relinquished jurisdiction to the 
Grand Chamber (under Article 30 of the Convention). The respondent State sought to 
justify the statutory ban in accordance with the limitation clauses of Articles 8(2) and 
9(2). In the government’s view the ban fell within the legitimate aims of protecting 
“public safety” and “the rights and freedoms of others”. The State believed that 
concealing one’s face in public was a rejection of social ties and the principle of “living 
together”. The ban did not discriminate against Muslim women and the light penalty was 
a proportionate sanction. The Belgian government intervened, a similar ban had been 
enacted in that State and upheld by its Constitutional Court, submitting that the wearing 
of a full-face veil was not required by the Koran and the Belgian Parliament sought to 
foster the integration of all individuals into society. Amnesty International submitted a 
written brief noting that the right to wear clothing with religious implications was 
protected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Another non-
governmental organization (hereafter “NGO”), ARTICLE 19, emphasised the freedom of 
expression aspect of the wearing of religious dress. The Human Rights Centre of Ghent 
University provided empirical evidence, based upon the views of 27 Belgian women who 
wore the full-face veil, that the women did not make that choice under coercion. The 
Centre requested the Court to consider the applicant’s complaints in the light of rising 
Islamophobia in some European States. Liberty, the British human rights NGO, 
submitted that the Law, whilst using neutral language, aimed to prohibit the wearing of 
the burqa in public places. The last third-party intervener was another NGO, the Open 
Society Justice Initiative, and it argued that there was a European consensus against 
banning the wearing of full-face veils in public places. 
 The Grand Chamber accepted the applicant’s contention that the wearing of facial 
clothing was within the scope of Article 8 of the ECHR. 
The Court is thus of the view that personal choices as to an individual’s desired 
appearance, whether in public or in private places, relate to the expression of his 
or her personality and thus fall within the notion of private life. ... A measure 
emanating from a public authority which restricts a choice of this kind will 
therefore, in principle, constitute an interference with the exercise of the right to 
respect for private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention…25 
However, as the applicant had complained that the French ban affected her choice of 
clothing required by religious practices the Grand Chamber considered that the case 
primarily fell to be considered under the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs 
secured by Article 9 of the Convention. Regarding whether the ban could be justified 
as being for the legitimate aims  of  “public safety” and  “protecting the rights of 
others”, the Grand Chamber rather reluctantly, given the legislative history of the 
Law, found that the ban fell within the public safety exceptions in Article 8(2) and 
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9(2). Likewise the Grand Chamber accepted that the Law’s objective of promoting 
“living together” could also be brought within the second legitimate aim above. 
The Court takes into account the respondent State’s point that the face plays an 
important role in social interaction. It can understand the view that individuals who 
are present in places open to all may not wish to see practices or attitudes 
developing there which would fundamentally call into question the possibility of 
open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an established consensus, 
forms an indispensable element of community life within the society in question. 
The Court is therefore able to accept that the barrier raised against others by a veil 
concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as breaching the right of 
others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier.26 
But, given the “flexibility” of the idea of “living together”, the Grand Chamber stated that 
it would have to  undertake a close scrutiny of the necessity of the French ban. 
 The Grand Chamber emphasised the subsidiary nature of the ECHR system. “In 
matters of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably 
differ widely, the role of the domestic policy-maker should be given special weight.”27 
This was particularly relevant in relationships between public authorities and religions. 
Consequently States had to be granted a “wide margin of appreciation” to determine 
what restrictions were necessary on the manifestation of religious beliefs. The Court 
would also consider the extent of any consensus between the practices of the State 
parties when evaluating the lawfulness of particular restrictions. Despite this deference 
to States the Grand Chamber did not find that the French ban was necessary to protect 
public safety. 
…in view of its impact on the rights of women who wish to wear the full-face veil 
for religious reasons, a blanket ban on the wearing in public places of clothing 
designed to conceal the face can be regarded as proportionate only in a context 
where there is a general threat to public safety. The Government have not shown 
that the ban introduced by the Law of 11 October 2010 falls into such a context. As 
to the women concerned, they are thus obliged to give up completely an element 
of their identity that they consider important, together with their chosen manner of 
manifesting their religion or beliefs, whereas the objective alluded to by the 
Government could be attained by a mere obligation to show their face and to 
identify themselves where a risk for the safety of persons and property has been 
established, or where particular circumstances entail a suspicion of identity fraud. 
It cannot therefore be found that the blanket ban imposed by the Law of 11 
October 2010 is necessary, in a democratic society, for public safety, within the 
meaning of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention.28 
As to the proportionality of the ban for the aim of promoting “living together, which the 
respondent State attached great weight too, the Grand Chamber acknowledged the 
“significant negative impact” the ban had on the “small number of women” affected. The 
Court was also very concerned about some  Islamophobic comments made during the 
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introduction of the ban in France, which had been highlighted by certain third-party 
interveners. Other relevant factors included the ban only applying to facial coverings, not 
being expressly based on the religious element of such clothing and the light 
punishments established for breaches of the Law. In respect of the European consensus 
the Grand Chamber concluded that: 
…there is little common ground amongst the member States of the Council of 
Europe … as to the question of the wearing of the full-face veil in public. The Court 
thus observes that, contrary to the submission of one of the third-party 
interveners…  there is no European consensus against a ban. Admittedly, from a 
strictly normative standpoint, France is very much in a minority position in Europe: 
except for Belgium, no other member State of the Council of Europe has, to date, 
opted for such a measure. It must be observed, however, that the question of the 
wearing of the full-face veil in public is or has been a subject of debate in a number 
of European States. In some it has been decided not to opt for a blanket ban. In 
others, such a ban is still being considered… It should be added that, in all 
likelihood, the question of the wearing of the full-face veil in public is simply not an 
issue at all in a certain number of member States, where this practice is 
uncommon. It can thus be said that in Europe there is no consensus as to whether 
or not there should be a blanket ban on the wearing of the full-face veil in public 
places. 
157. Consequently, having regard in particular to the breadth of the margin of 
appreciation afforded to the respondent State in the present case, the Court finds 
that the ban imposed by the Law of 11 October 2010 can be regarded as 
proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the conditions of 
“living together” as an element of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others”.29 
Therefore, an overwhelming majority of the Grand Chamber, fifteen votes to two, found 
no breaches of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. Judges Nussberger and Jaderblom 
dissented as they did not believe that the French ban pursued a legitimate aim under 
Articles 8 and 9. Regarding the majority’s classification of the French justification of the 
ban, by promoting living together, as falling within protection of “the rights and  
freedoms of others” the dissenters considered “the concept seems far-fetched and 
vague.”30 Even if the ban fell within a legitimate Convention limitation the dissenters did 
not accept that it was a proportionate measure. Unlike the majority they would not 
accord a wide margin of appreciation to France as the ban targeted a clothing code 
linked to religious, cultural and personal convictions. Furthermore, the dissenters 
disputed the non-existence of a European consensus against a facial covering ban, as 45 
States had not enacted a ban. They also queried the majority’s view that the penalties 
for violating the Law were mild, as the recurrent practice of wearing a full-face veil was 
likely to result in multiple punishments. Overall the dissenters concluded, “we find that 
the criminalisation of the wearing of a full-face veil is a measure which is 
disproportionate to the aim of protecting the idea of “living together”- an aim which 
                                                          
29
 Ibid. at paras. 156-157. 
 
30
 Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jaderblom at para. 5. 
 
12 
 
cannot readily be reconciled with the Convention’s restrictive catalogue of grounds for 
interference with basic human rights.”31 
 The majority’s deference to the policy-decision to ban full-face coverings in public 
places, reached via the French legislative process, chimes with the repeated emphasis on 
the subsidiary role of the Court under the ECHR system propounded by States during 
recent inter-governmental conferences and their amendment of the Preamble to the 
Convention contained in Protocol 15.32 Nevertheless, the majority did not accept that the 
general ban was necessary on public safety grounds. Hence even where the Court is 
according States a wide margin of appreciation there is still European supervision and 
the Court may not find some interferences by public authorities to be compatible with 
the Convention. Noting the dissenters’ views regarding the legitimacy of the living 
together aim invoked by France and the nature of the European consensus it may well 
be that the majority’s generous evaluations of these elements, in favour of the 
respondent State, was another aspect of the Grand Chamber’s reluctance to rule against 
a Law that had received extensive parliamentary endorsement.  
 
ARTICLE 41: JUST SATISFACTION IN AN INTER-STATE CASE 
A Grand Chamber delivered the first judgment of the Court on the ability of a successful 
applicant State to claim damages, under Article 41, from the respondent State in Cyprus 
v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction)33. This momentous litigation34 had begun in 1994 with an 
application brought by Cyprus alleging breaches of many Convention rights by Turkey as 
a consequence of the latter’s invasion of northern Cyprus during 1974. The applicant 
government and the (former) European Commission of Human Rights referred the 
application to the Court in 1999, in accordance with the pre-Protocol 11 Convention 
system. Following discussions, between the President of the Court and the State Agents 
of Cyprus and Turkey, the former wrote to the State Parties (in November 1999) 
informing them that Cyprus did not need to submit any claim for just satisfaction at that 
stage of the proceedings. A further procedure dealing with such claims would be held at 
a later date depending upon the Court’s judgment on the merits of Cyprus’ complaints. 
In May 2001 the Grand Chamber determined that Turkey had violated numerous Articles 
of the ECHR.35 The judges were unanimous in concluding that the issue of just 
satisfaction should be adjourned for consideration at a later date. The Committee of 
Ministers assumed responsibility for supervising that judgment, under Article 46 of the 
ECHR, a process which was still continuing in May 2014. 
 During August 2007 the Cypriot government notified the Court that it intended to 
submit an application for the consideration of Article 41 in respect of the 2001 merits 
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judgment. In March 2010 Cyprus submitted just satisfaction claims regarding the 
missing persons (the 2001 judgment had found breaches of Articles 2, 3 and 5 
concerning more than one thousand persons who had disappeared during the invasion in 
1974). The Cypriot authorities reserved their claims for just satisfaction regarding other 
Convention violations found in the 2001 judgment. Subsequently, both parties filed 
observations and in 2011 the Cypriot government requested the Court to take action to 
facilitate the enforcement of the 2001 judgment. Following Court deliberations Cyprus 
was asked, in March 2012, to submit a final set of just satisfaction claims. This was done 
in June 2012, when Cyprus added claims in respect of enclaved Greek Cypriots living on 
the Karpas peninsular (whose rights under Articles 3, 8, 9, 10, 13 and Article 2 of 
Protocol No 1 to the  Convention had been found to have been infringed in the 2001 
judgment). 
 The Grand Chamber reached its just satisfaction judgment after a series of 
private deliberations and without a public oral hearing. Turkey had argued that, even 
assuming that Article 41 applied to inter-State cases the applicant’s claims for just 
satisfaction ought to be dismissed for undue delay. The Grand Chamber, subject to the 
dissent of the Turkish Judge Karakas, determined that the passage of time since the 
merits judgment had not rendered the just satisfaction claims inadmissible. Whilst the 
majority acknowledged that general international law requires applicant States to bring 
their claims without undue delay36, in this litigation the impugned delay occurred after 
the Court had delivered its judgment on the merits. Furthermore, the Court had 
adjourned the issue of claims for just satisfaction in that judgment and subsequently the 
Cypriot government had never waived its claims. The Grand Chamber also sought to 
distinguish between its role to determine claims for just satisfaction and the supervisory 
responsibilities of the Committee of Ministers37. 
Insofar as the Turkish Government have referred to the supervisory proceedings 
before the Committee of Ministers, the Court reiterates that findings of a violation 
in its judgments are essentially declaratory, and that, by Article 46 of the 
Convention, the High Contracting Parties have undertaken to abide by the final 
judgments of the Court in any case to which they are parties, execution being 
supervised by the Committee of Ministers (Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz 
(VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, § 61, ECHR 2009). In this 
respect, one should not confuse, on the one hand, proceedings before the Court 
which is competent to find violations of the Convention in final judgments which 
are binding on the States Parties (Article 19, in conjunction with Article 46 § 1), 
and to afford just satisfaction (Article 41) where relevant, and, on the other hand, 
the mechanism for supervising the execution of judgments, under the Committee 
of Ministers’ responsibility (Article 46 § 2). Under Article 46, the State Party is 
under an obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by the 
Court by way of just satisfaction, but also to take individual or, if appropriate, 
general measures in its domestic legal order, or both, to put an end to the violation 
found by the Court and to redress the effects, the aim being to put the applicant, 
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as far as possible, in the position he would have been in had the requirements of 
the Convention not been disregarded (ibid., § 85). Albeit connected with each 
other, the obligation to take individual or general measures, or both, and the 
payment of just satisfaction are two distinct forms of redress, and the former in no 
way precludes the latter.38 
 Regarding the applicability of Article 41 to inter-State complaints Cyprus 
contended that the text of that Article does not distinguish between individual and inter-
State cases. The original Court had not declared just satisfaction claims to be 
inapplicable in Ireland v. UK39, merely that it was not necessary for the Court to apply 
the relevant Article in that case. Turkey responded that Article 41 did not apply to inter-
State cases as, according to the former European Commission of Human Rights40, the 
applicant State in such cases was acting to vindicate the public order of Europe, rather 
than the rights of the State or its nationals. Additionally, in accordance with the Court’s 
jurisprudence, just satisfaction was related to factors such as victims’ pain and suffering, 
distress and feelings of injustice. In the view of the respondent government those factors 
exclusively concerned natural persons. 
 The Grand Chamber acknowledged that it had not been necessary for the Court 
to apply former Article 50 of the ECHR41, governing just satisfaction, in Ireland v. UK as 
the applicant government had expressly declared that they were not seeking financial 
compensation for victims. Having regard to the Travaux preparatoires of the ECHR the 
Grand Chamber believed that the intention behind the Convention’s provision on just 
satisfaction was derived from public international law principles relating to State liability. 
The most significant of these was that breach of a legal obligation requires adequate 
reparation. Consequently, the Grand Chamber could not adopt a restrictive interpretation 
of the scope of Article 41. 
The Court therefore considers that Article 41 of the Convention does, as such, 
apply to inter-State cases. However, the question whether granting just 
satisfaction to an applicant State is justified has to be assessed and decided by the 
Court on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, inter alia, the type of complaint 
made by the applicant Government, whether the victims of violations can be 
identified, as well as the main purpose of bringing the proceedings insofar as this 
can be discerned from the initial application to the Court. The Court acknowledges 
that an application brought before it under Article 33 of the Convention may 
contain different types of complaints pursuing different goals. In such cases each 
complaint has to be addressed separately in order to determine whether awarding 
just satisfaction in respect of it would be justified.42 
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The Grand Chamber expressed the view that where an applicant State complained about 
general issues, such as systemic breaches or violations resulting from an administrative 
practice, then the primary goal of the applicant was to safeguard public order in Europe 
and it may not be appropriate for the Court to award just satisfaction, even when 
claimed by the applicant. A different category of inter-State complaints were those 
where the applicant State alleged that the respondent State had violated the Convention 
rights of the former State’s nationals or other victims. The Grand Chamber considered 
that this category of complaints had many similarities with individual applications 
(brought by victims under Article 34 of the ECHR) and with claims made under 
diplomatic protection by States. It could be appropriate for the Court to award just 
satisfaction for successful complaints in this category of inter-State cases. 
However, it must be always kept in mind that, according to the very nature of the 
Convention, it is the individual, and not the State, who is directly or indirectly 
harmed and primarily “injured” by a violation of one or several Convention rights. 
Therefore, if just satisfaction is afforded in an inter-State case, it should always be 
done for the benefit of individual victims.43 
Given that Cyprus had made just satisfaction claims in respect of Convention violations 
regarding two identifiable groups of people (the 1,456 missing persons and the enclaved 
Greek Cypriot residents of the Karpas peninsular) and the applicant State had not sought 
compensation on behalf of itself, the Grand Chamber determined that the granting of 
just satisfaction would be appropriate. 
 The Cypriot government initially requested EUR 12,000 per missing person, for 
distribution to their families. This was the amount awarded by the Court in separate 
Article 34 litigation by some family members who had successfully complained that 
Turkey had not conducted effective investigations into the disappearances of their 
relatives.44 Subsequently, the Cypriot government sought an unspecified greater sum to 
reflect higher  awards in more recent cases. The Turkish government replied that the 
Court had not detailed the number of missing persons in its merits judgment and the 
number of potential beneficiaries had altered over time (aggravated by the applicant 
government’s delay in seeking just satisfaction). Regarding the Karpas residents the 
Cypriot government sought a “modest” payment of at least £50,000 per individual for 
their non-pecuniary losses. Turkey responded that the applicant had taken eleven years 
to make this claim and had failed to identify the number of potential beneficiaries.  
 The Grand Chamber endorsed its earlier view in Varnava and Others that: 
In many cases where a law, procedure or practice has been found to fall short of 
Convention standards this is enough to put matters right. ... In some situations, 
however, the impact of the violation may be regarded as being of a nature and 
degree as to have impinged so significantly on the moral well-being of the 
applicant as to require something further. Such elements do not lend themselves to 
a process of calculation or precise quantification. Nor is it the Court’s role to 
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function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in apportioning fault and 
compensatory damages between civil parties. Its guiding principle is equity, which 
above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and 
reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of 
the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred. Its non-
pecuniary awards serve to give recognition to the fact that moral damage occurred 
as a result of a breach of a fundamental human right and reflect in the broadest of 
terms the severity of the damage; they are not, nor should they be, intended to 
give financial comfort or sympathetic enrichment at the expense of the Contracting 
Party concerned.45 
The Grand Chamber found that there was no doubt about the protracted anxiety suffered 
by the Karpas residents due to the violation of numerous of their Convention rights. 
Therefore, the Grand Chamber (by 15 votes to 2) ordered that Turkey pay EUR 60 
million for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the Karpas residents and EUR 30 
million for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the relatives of the missing persons. 
Those sums were to be distributed by the applicant government to the individual victims 
of the relevant breaches of the ECHR. Distribution should be completed within eighteen 
months of the payments by Turkey (or other time-frame specified by the Committee of 
Ministers exercising its role of supervising the execution of Court judgments under ECHR 
Article 46). 
 During the above just satisfaction proceedings, in November 2011, the applicant 
State asked the Court to issue a “declaratory judgment”, inter alia, stating that in 
accordance with the merits judgment and Article 46 of the Convention Turkey was 
required to “abstain from permitting, participating or acquiescing or being otherwise 
complicit in, the unlawful sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot homes and property in 
the northern part of Cyprus”. In its just satisfaction judgment the Grand Chamber 
concluded that it was not necessary to consider if the Court had the competence to make 
such a declaration  as Turkey was bound by the relevant parts of the merits judgment. 
It is recalled in this connection that the Court has held that there had been a 
continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by virtue of the fact that Greek-
Cypriot owners of property in northern Cyprus are being denied access to and 
control, use and enjoyment of their property as well as any compensation for the 
interference with their property rights (section III, point 4 of the operative part of 
the principal judgment). It thus falls to the Committee of Ministers to ensure that 
this holding which is binding in accordance with the Convention, and which has not 
yet been complied with, is given full effect by the respondent Government. Such 
compliance could not, in the Court’s opinion, be consistent with any possible 
permission, participation, acquiescence or otherwise complicity in any unlawful sale 
or exploitation of Greek Cypriot homes and property in the northern part of Cyprus. 
Furthermore the Court’s decision in the case of Demopoulos and Others [v. 
Turkey]46 to the effect that cases presented by individuals concerning violation of 
property complaints were to be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, 
                                                          
45
 Ibid., at para. 224. 
 
 
46
 No. 46113/99, 5 Mar. 2010. 
 
17 
 
cannot be considered, on its own, to dispose of the question of Turkey’s compliance 
with section III of the operative provisions of the principal judgment in the inter-
State case.47 
However, within the Grand Chamber there were sharply differing opinions about the 
above statement. Nine judges issued a concurring opinion in which they wrote: 
The present judgment heralds a new era in the enforcement of human rights 
upheld by the Court and marks an important step in ensuring respect for the rule 
of law in Europe. It is the first time in the Court’s history that the Court has made a 
specific judicial statement as to the import and effect of one of its judgments in the 
context of execution. 
The Court’s statement, couched in strong and clear terms, is directed to a 
particular aspect of the execution process still pending before the Committee of 
Ministers. It is rendered all the more powerful, in what it signifies, by reason of the 
view expressed by the Court that, in the circumstances, such statement does, of 
itself, obviate the need to examine whether a formal declaratory judgment for the 
purposes of Article 46 of the Convention might be issued under Article 41. The 
Court has spoken: it remains for it to be heard.48 
Whereas five judges considered that the Court had exceeded its’ authority under the 
Convention by commenting, in the last sentence of paragraph 63 above, on the 
Committee of Ministers continuing supervision of the merits judgment. 
In our view, such a statement- even if it is not contained in the operative 
provisions- seeks to extend the powers of the Court and runs counter to Article 
46(2) of the Convention by encroaching on the powers of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, to which the Convention has entrusted the task 
of supervising execution of the Court’s judgments. 
7. The Court does not have jurisdiction to verify whether a Contracting Party has 
complied with the obligations imposed on it by one of the Court’s judgments…49 
The protracted process of the Committee of Ministers’ seeking to secure Turkey’s 
compliance with the inter-State merits judgment50 combined with a series of individual 
applications raising overlapping complaints provided the backdrop to the Grand 
Chamber’s unique statement regarding Turkey’s obligations flowing  from the 2001 
judgment.  
 The Grand Chamber was more united in its clear ruling that financial 
compensation could be awarded, under Article 41 of the Convention, in appropriate 
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inter-State cases. The key factor being whether the Court finds that individuals have 
suffered as a consequence of the respondent State’s breaches of their Convention rights 
and freedoms. Uncertainties as to the scope of this financial liability remain, for example 
can a successful applicant State claim just satisfaction in respect of the pecuniary losses 
of individuals (note, Cyprus had sought to reserve just satisfaction claims regarding the 
homes and property of Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus adversely affected by the 1974 
invasion and its aftermath)? Also, will applicant States be able to make just satisfaction 
claims on behalf of non-human victims, such as companies51 who are eligible to bring 
their own individual applications under Article 34 of the ECHR? It is interesting to note 
that making “its assessment on an equitable basis”52 the Grand Chamber’s aggregate 
award for the surviving relatives of the missing persons works out at approximately EUR 
20,000 per missing person, over fifty percent higher than the original sum claimed by 
the Cypriot government. 
 Judge Pinto De Albuquerque, from Portugal, issued a lengthy and strongly argued 
(with parts in underlined text) concurring opinion. 
The Cyprus v. Turkey (just satisfaction) case is the most important contribution to 
peace in Europe in the history of the European Court of Human Rights (“the 
Court”). The Court has not only acknowledged the applicability of Article 41 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) to inter-State 
applications and established criteria for the assessment of the time-limit for these 
just satisfaction claims, but has awarded punitive damages to the claimant State. 
The message to member States of the Council of Europe is clear: those member 
States that wage war, invade or support foreign armed intervention in other 
member States must pay for their unlawful actions and the consequences of their 
actions, and the victims, their families and the States of their nationality have a 
vested and enforceable right to be duly and fully compensated by the responsible 
warring State. War and its tragic consequences are no longer tolerable in Europe 
and those member States that do not comply with this principle must be made 
judicially accountable for their actions, without prejudice to additional political 
consequences.53 
He explained that that the terms “punitive damages”, as used in the USA and continental 
Europe and “exemplary damages” as used elsewhere in the Commonwealth had the 
same meaning. “Punitive or exemplary damages are understood as being established 
with the purpose of atoning for the deeds of the wrongdoer and preventing repetition of 
the wrongful act by the offender or emulation by third parties, without being limited to 
mere compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses caused to the claimant, 
including loss of profit.”54 He sought to demonstrate that the Court’s jurisprudence 
disclosed the awarding of punitive damages in a number of different contexts. 
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Summing up, the Court has been at the forefront of an international trend, using 
just satisfaction to prevent further violations of human rights and punish 
wrongdoing governments. The acknowledgment of punitive or exemplary damages 
under the Convention is essential in at least three cases: (1) gross violations of 
human rights protected by the Convention or the additional Protocols, especially 
when there are multiple violations at the same time, repeated violations over a 
significant period of time or a single continuing violation over a significant period of 
time; (2) prolonged, deliberate non-compliance with a judgment of the Court 
delivered with regard to the recalcitrant Contracting Party; and (3) the severe 
curtailment, or threat thereof, of the applicant’s human rights with the purpose of 
avoiding, impairing or restricting his or her access to the Court as well as the 
Court’s access to the applicant. 
... 
Therefore, punitive damages are an appropriate and necessary instrument for 
fulfilling the Court’s mission to uphold human rights in Europe and ensuring the 
observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties in the 
Convention and the Protocols thereto (Article 19 of the Convention). This 
conclusion applies with even greater force in the case at hand, where the 
respondent State not only committed a multitude of gross human rights violations 
over a significant period of time in Northern Cyprus, and did not investigate the 
most significant of these violations adequately and in a timely manner, but also 
deliberately failed year after year to comply with the Grand Chamber’s judgment 
on the merits delivered a long time ago with regard to these specific violations. 
Whilst many will agree with the Judge’s sentiments regarding the importance of legal 
sanctions against European States that utilise military force against fellow members of 
the Council of Europe, his arguments regarding the Court’s ability to award punitive 
damages is in direct contrast to the more cautious attitude expressed in the Grand 
Chamber’s judgment55. It is also significant that despite consideration, during the 
drafting of Protocol no.14 to the ECHR56, of the possibility of conferring the power for the 
Court to impose financial penalties on a respondent State that had failed to implement 
an earlier judgment against it, the final text did not provide for such a power within 
revised Article 46 of the ECHR. 
 
ARTICLE 4 of Protocol No.4: INTER-STATE JUDGMENT 
A Grand Chamber delivered only the third judgment by the Court on the merits of an 
inter-State application in Georgia v Russia(I)57. The case concerned the alleged mass 
arrest, detention and deportation of Georgian citizens from Russia in late 2006 to early 
2007. The background to this campaign was the “political tensions”58 that had developed 
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between these neighbouring States and the arrest of four Russian officers in Tbilisi, the 
Georgian capital, at the end of September 2006. Russia then suspended all air, road, 
rail, maritime, postal and financial connections with Georgia. Soon afterwards 
international and non-governmental organizations began reporting widespread Russian 
expulsions of Georgian nationals from its territory. Georgia lodged this application in 
March 2007, alleging the Russian authorities’ actions constituted an “administrative 
practice” violating a number of Articles of the Convention and additional Protocols. In 
June 2009 a Chamber declared the application admissible and in December of that year 
relinquished jurisdiction (under Article 30 of the ECHR) to the Grand Chamber. 
 The Grand Chamber adopted the unusual procedure of holding an in camera oral 
hearing of witnesses, before a panel of five Grand Chamber judges, to help “clarify” the 
facts underlying the complaints. Each State party was invited to nominate ten witnesses 
they wished the Court to hear and the Court invited a further five witnesses that it 
selected. The oral hearings took place at Strasbourg early in 2011. Most of the Georgian 
witnesses were persons who had been subject to arrest, detention and expulsion from 
Russia during the relevant time period. The Russian witnesses were officials having 
various responsibilities connected with the subject-matter of the application (e.g. an 
Inspector in the Federal Migration Service at Moscow and the Deputy Head of the Civil 
Security Force Moscow). Two witnesses selected by the Court were heard (Mr G. 
Tugushi, Human Rights Officer with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe mission to Georgia at the relevant time and Mr E. Matyas, Rapporteur of the 
Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe at the 
material time). Three other Russian witnesses invited by the Court, including the Acting 
Head of the Directorate of Internal Affairs of Leningrad at the relevant time, did not 
attend due to various reasons including the sudden admission to hospital of the witness 
or the Russian authorities’ refusal  to serve a witness summons on the named person. 
Summaries of the evidence given were appended to the judgment subsequently 
delivered by the Grand Chamber. A normal oral hearing in public was held by the Grand 
Chamber on the merits of the application in June 2012. 
 A key part of Georgia’s evidence that Russia had engaged in an administrative 
practice were two circulars issued by the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of St 
Petersburg on 30 September and 2 October 2006 which, inter alia, ordered that “large-
scale measures be undertaken to identify as many citizens of the Republic of Georgia as 
possible who are unlawfully residing on Russian territory and deport them.” Despite 
repeated requests by the Court for Russia to provide copies of the circulars the 
respondent State refused to do so. Russia admitted the existence of the circulars, but 
denied their content was that asserted by Georgia, and claimed that the circulars were 
“State secret” and therefore disclosure was prohibited under national law. Given the 
importance of these documents the Grand Chamber began by considering whether 
Russia had complied with its duty, under Article 38 of the ECHR, to “furnish all necessary 
facilities” towards the Court’s examination of the case. The Grand Chamber held that its 
approach to Article 38 developed in applications brought by individuals should also apply 
to inter-State complaints. Hence a failure by a State to provide information at its 
disposal without a satisfactory reason could be taken account of by the Court when 
drawing evidential inferences and in determining if a breach of Article 38 had occurred. 
The Grand Chamber doubted the classification of the two circulars as secret given that 
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their implementation required widespread dissemination amongst many public officials at 
different levels of seniority. Therefore, subject to the dissent of the Russian judge, the 
Grand Chamber found that Russia had violated Article 38. 
 Georgia submitted that the witnesses they had presented before the Court clearly 
demonstrated that there had been an organised campaign against Georgian nationals 
introduced by the Russian authorities during the relevant time and that was further 
reflected in the increased numbers of Georgians expelled at that time. Russia contested 
those claims. The Grand Chamber reaffirmed the established jurisprudence that an 
administrative practice required two elements; “repetition of acts” and “official 
tolerance”.59 As the respondent State had failed to provide the Court with monthly 
expulsion statistics the Grand Chamber accepted the Georgian assertion that over 4,600 
expulsion orders had been issued between September  2006 and January 2007 against 
its nationals and nearly 2,400 of those had been detained and forcibly expelled. The 
Court also had regard to reports produced by international governmental and non-
governmental organisations (include the Parliamentary Assembly and Human Rights 
Watch) which confirmed the statements given by the Georgian witnesses. Taking 
account of its finding of a breach of Article 38, noted above, the Grand Chamber found a 
“strong presumption”60 that the content of the Russian circulars were as alleged by 
Georgia. “Having regard to all those factors, the Court concludes that from October 2006 
a coordinated policy of arresting, detaining and expelling Georgian nationals was put in 
place in the Russian Federation which amounted to an administrative practice for the 
purposes of Convention case-law.”61 Furthermore, as the applicant government had 
asserted such a practice as the basis of its application (rather than seeking Court 
determinations of alleged breaches in respect of specified individuals) it was exempt 
from the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies in Russia. 
 The first substantive breach alleged by Georgia was that Russia had undertaken a 
collective expulsions of aliens (Georgian nationals) prohibited by Article 4 of Protocol No. 
4. The applicant State contended that the Russian judicial authorities had not examined 
the merits of the individual expulsion decisions concerning Georgians. Witnesses and 
international/non-governmental reports confirmed that Russian judges had, inter alia, 
used standard form expulsion orders and failed to consider the specific factual 
circumstances of cases. The responded State disputed the credibility of the Georgian 
witnesses. The Grand Chamber reaffirmed the Court’s established jurisprudence 
regarding Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, that a breach occurred where collective expulsions 
did not involve “a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each 
individual alien of the group”.62 The Grand Chamber noted the Parliamentary Assembly 
Monitoring Committee had found routine deportation procedures being applied to the 
Georgians involving brief (two to ten minute) court proceedings, normally without 
lawyers. Also, the Georgian witnesses gave similar accounts of their deportations. 
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Therefore, subject to the dissent of the Russian judge, the Grand Chamber found Russia 
had breached Article 1 of Protocol No. 4 by its administrative practice. 
 By the same majority the Grand Chamber went on to conclude that Russia had 
breached the right to liberty (guaranteed by ECHR Article 5(1)) and the right to judicial 
scrutiny of the lawfulness of detention (provided by ECHR Article 5(4)). The “collective” 
nature of the arrests of Georgians living in Russia meant that they were arbitrary, and 
therefore unlawful, under Article 5. Likewise the majority also found the extremely 
overcrowded conditions of detention in which the Georgians were held, for between a 
few hours and a couple of days in police cells followed by up to two weeks in detention 
centres, amounted to an administrative practice of both inhuman and degrading 
treatment in violation of ECHR Article 3. In reaching that determination the Grand 
Chamber expressed the view that it found the testimony of the Georgian witnesses more 
credible than that of the Russian officials. By large majorities the Grand Chamber also 
found breaches of ECHR Article 13 (right to an effective domestic remedy) in conjunction 
with Article 5(1) and Article 3. 
 An overwhelming majority of the Grand Chamber (sixteen votes to one) held that 
it was not necessary for the Court to examine Georgia’s complaints that the Russian 
practice amounted to discriminatory treatment, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention 
in conjunction with the above substantive rights, or a violation of Article 18 of the 
ECHR63 when combined with those rights. Judge Tsotsoria, from Georgia, wrote a 
lengthy partly dissenting opinion in which she, citing reports by Human Rights Watch and 
the Parliamentary Assembly, expressed the belief that: 
The illegal anti-Georgian policy should be viewed in the light, and as a direct result, 
of the political statements made by leading members of the Russian Government, 
including the President, Foreign Minister, Deputy Head of the Federal Migration 
Service, Speaker of the State Duma and Defence Minister. … 
The violation of the rights of Georgians based on their nationality and ethnic origin 
was deeply rooted in discrimination, which is the fundamental aspect of the present 
case. Accordingly, failure to examine Article 14 artificially reduces the scope of the 
non-discrimination provision of the Convention and disregards the very core 
feature of this inter-State application…64 
 Judge Dedov, from Russia, also produced a long dissenting opinion in which he 
was highly critical of the majority’s methods of establishing the facts in this disputed 
case. He believed that the Grand Chamber had relied on reports from international 
organizations that had not provided a documentary basis for their findings. 
Furthermore he considered that reports from “human-rights activists” may 
“exaggerate the gravity of violations”. 
I regret that I cannot share the opinion of the majority, who have found a violation 
of various Articles of the Convention in the present case. In my view, the Court has 
taken a controversial approach to the establishment of the facts, assessment of the 
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evidence and application of its own case-law which is hardly acceptable in a 
situation of strong political opposition between the high authorities of the applicant 
and respondent States. In such a situation the Court has to carefully examine all 
the materials and make well-founded conclusions in order to avoid any concerns 
being raised about its impartiality. This task would be much easier if the hearings 
and deliberations in any inter-State case were held by the Court only after peaceful 
negotiations had been conducted between the parties to mitigate political and 
emotional tensions. Without such measures a rational analysis of cases like this can 
never be successful.65 
Georgia v Russia (I) dramatically illustrates the type of rare situation where a 
Member State of the Council of Europe is willing to resist the institutional pressures of 
collaborative  relationships and activities to launch a formal complaint before the 
Court against a fellow State Party. Clearly the Grand Chamber’s findings as to the 
background events to this litigation disclosed that bi-lateral relations between Georgia 
and Russia had become completely fractured. Presumably, therefore, the applicant 
State did not fear that initiating an inter-State complaint would create any greater 
damage to its relations with the respondent State. Indeed, during the next year 
serious armed conflict occurred between the two States; that is the subject-matter of 
a second inter-State case brought by Georgia. The Court will also have to return to 
the above case as the matter of just satisfaction has been left pending. Georgia 
requested the Grand Chamber “to award just satisfaction under Article 41, namely, 
compensation, reparation, restitutio in integrum, costs, expenses and further and 
other relief to be specified for all the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered or 
incurred by the injured parties as a result of the violations and the pursuit of these 
proceedings.”66 However, the Grand Chamber decided that the application of Article 
41 was not ready for examination and the parties should submit their written 
observations on that matter to the Court within twelve months. Optimistically, the 
Grand Chamber invited them to notify the Court of any agreement they reached. 
 The judgment in Georgia v Russia (I) is, sadly, another example of a high-profile 
case where the Grand Chamber has found that Russia failed, without good cause, to 
supply the Court with crucial documentary evidence in its possession. As we noted in 
last year’s rapport Russia likewise refused to disclose key documentation on the 
investigation into the Second World War Katyn and related massacres committed by 
USSR personnel to the Court.67 These are worrying demonstrations of the Russian 
government’s unconstructive attitude towards the Court and its Convention duties. 
 Regarding other pending inter-State applications against Russia68, in April 2015 
the Court announced that it had granted Russia an extension of time, until 25 
September 2015, to file its observations on the admissibility of the two Article 33 
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applications filed by Ukraine.69 These complaints concern (1) the Russian Federation 
assuming control over the Crimean peninsula from March 2014 and subsequent 
developments in Eastern Ukraine up to the beginning of September 2014 and (2) the 
alleged abduction of three groups of children in Eastern Ukraine and their temporary 
transfer to Russia on three occasions between June and August 2014. The Court is 
also dealing with 526 individual applications (brought under Article 34 of the ECHR) 
involving alleged Convention violations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. 307 of these 
applications are against both Russia and Ukraine, whilst 194 have been lodged against 
Ukraine and 25 solely against Russia.  
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